Online Papers in Philosophy

Here’s an update for today!

• Alex Byrne (with David Hilbert), Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance
• Anne Newstead, On the reality of the continuum
  

  Philosophy 83 (2008), 117-27.

• —-, Interpreting Anscombe’s `Intention’ 32ff
  

  Journal of Philosophical Research, 2009.

• Barry Loewer, Dyadic Deontic Detachment
• —-, Descartes’ Skeptical and Anti-Skeptical Arguments
• —-, Leibniz and the Ontological Argument
• —-, Cotenability and Counterfactual Logics
• —-, From Information to Intentionality
• Ben Bradley (with Kris McDaniel), Desires
  

  (Mind 117: 267-302)

• Carlo Cellucci, Why Proof? What is a Proof?
  

  in R. Lupacchini & G. Corsi (Eds.), Deduction, Computation, Experiment. Exploring the Effectiveness of Proof, Springer, Berlin 2008, to appear.

• Dan Moller, Meta-reasoning and Practical Deliberation
  

  Sometimes there is evidence about what we would decide to do from an improved deliberative position—one in which we have better information, say, or are subject to less bias, or are able to consider the relevant facts with greater vividness. I argue that in such situations we should act on that evidence, and that there are some important ethical and prudential applications for this idea. Following through with this suggestion allows us to respond to the fact that we are prone to error by making the appropriate adjustments in our decision-making. A secondary goal is to explore the neglected role of vividness in our decision-making.

• Daniel Nolan, Properties and Paradox in Graham Priest’s Towards Non-Being
  

  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76.1: 191-198 This paper is to appear in a book symposium on Graham Priest’s Towards Non-Being.

• David Barnett, Yalcin on ‘Might’
  

  Forthcoming in Mind.

• David Nicolas, Mass nouns and plural logic
  

  Abstract: A dilemma put forward by Schein (1993) and Rayo (2002) suggests that, in order to characterize the semantics of plurals, we should not use predicate logic, but plural logic, a formal language whose terms may refer to several things at once. We show that a similar dilemma applies to mass nouns. If we use predicate logic and sets when characterizing their semantics, we arrive at a Russellian paradox. And if we use predicate logic and mereoogical ums, the semantics turns out to be too weak. We then develop an account where mass nouns are treated as non-singular terms. This semantics is faithful to the intuition that, if there are eight pieces of silverware on a table, the speaker refers to eight things at once when he says: “The silverware that is on the table comes from Italy.” We show that this account provides a satisfactory semantics for a wide range of sentences.

• Ed Zalta (with Paul Oppenheimer), A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument
• Fiery Cushman, Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment
• —-, Reviving Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy
• Franz Huber, Reply to Crupi et al.’s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’
  

  ([2008]), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

• —-, Belief and Degrees of Belief
  

  In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief.

• Gilbert Harman, Naturalism in Moral Philosophy
  

  PDF, a draft (without references) of a talk at a conference at Kansas State University in early April.

• Holly Smith, The Collective Interpretation of Utilitarian Generalization
  

  Philosophical Studies, Vol. 34 (August, 1978), pp. 207-211.

• —-, Rawls and Utilitarianism
  

  in John Rawls’ Theory of Social Justice, eds. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth Smith (Ohio University Press, 1980), pp.346-394.

• —-, Amniocentesis for Sex Selection
  

  in Ethics, Humanism, and Medicine, ed. Marc Basson (New York: Alan R. Liss, 1980), pp. 81-94.

• Ray Jackendoff, Compounding in the Parallel Architecture and Conceptual Semantics
  

  To appear in Handbook of Compounding, Oxford.

• —-, The peculiar logic of value
  

  Journal of Cognition and Culture 6, 375-407.

• —-, Construction after construction and its theoretical challenges
  

  to appear in Language.

• —-, Linguistics in cognitive science: The state of the art
  

  The Linguistic Review 24, 347-401 (2007).

• —-, Language
  

  to appear in Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science.

• —-, Conceptual Semantics
  

  to appear in Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning, de Gruyter.

• —-, The Parallel Architecture and its Place in Cognitive Science
  

  to appear in Oxford Handbook of Linguistic Analysis and in Morphology Multi-Dimensional.

• —-, Your theory of language evolution depends on your theory of language
• —- (with Steven Pinker), The faculty of language: What’s special about it?
  

  Cognition 95, 201-236 (2005).

• Ian Phillips, Indiscriminability and Experience of Change
  

  (Revised Draft)

• —-, Seeing Movements
• James Franklin (with A. Newstead), On the reality of the continuum
  

  Philosophy 83 (2008), 117-27.

• Jason Bridges, Pulling Semantic Contextualism Out by Its Roots
• —-, Rationality, Normativity and Transparency
• —-, Rule-Following Skepticism, Properly So Called
• —-, Wittgenstein vs. Semantic Contextualism
• Jay Odenbaugh, Ecology and the Inescapability of Values
  

  Science and Engineering Ethics, to appear.

• —- (with Matt Haber, Andrew Hamilton, and Samir Okasha), Philosophy of Biology
  

  Philosophy of the Special Sciences, edited by Fritz Allhof, Blackwell Press.

• —-, Models in Biology
  

  Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, to appear.

• Jeff McMahon, Comment
  

  in Michael Doyle, Striking First: Preemption and Prevention in International Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

• —-, Collective Crime and Collective Punishment
  

  Criminal Justice Ethics (forthcoming).

• John Bell, Contribution to “Philosophy of Mathematics: 5 Questions”
  

  V. Hendricks and H. Leitgeb, eds., Automatic Press, 2007.

• —-, Cosmological Theories and the Question of the Existence of a Creator
  

  Religion and the Challenges of Science, Ashgate Publishers, 2007.

• Josh Parsons, Assessment-contextual indexicals
  

  Traditionally, it has been supposed that each utterance of a natural language sentence expresses just one proposition — the same proposition to each person who hears it — and each proposition has just one truth value. Some recent work in the philosophy of language{For example, MacFarlane , Lasersohn , Egan casts doubt on these assumptions. It has been suggested both that assessment (and not just utterance) makes a contribution to context (so that one utterance may express different propositions to different hearers) and that truth may be assessment relative (so that one proposition may have different truth values for different hearers)….

• Kevin Klement, The Senses of Functions in the Logic of Sense and Denotation
  

  Please do not cite without my permission.

• —-, A Cantorian Argument Against Frege’s and Early Russell’s Theories of Descriptions
  

  forthcoming in Russell vs. Meinong: 100 Years After “On Denoting”, eds. Dale Jacquette and Nicholas Griffin.

• Leif Wenar, Property Rights and the Resource Curse
  

  forthcoming in Philosophy & Public Affairs [2008].

• —- (with B. Milanovic), Are Liberal Peoples Peaceful?
  

  forthcoming in The Journal of Political Philosophy [2008].

• —-, John Rawls
  

  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

• —-, The Meanings of Freedom
  

  in Contemporary Debates in Social Philosophy, ed. L. Thomas (Blackwell, 2008): 43-53.

• —- (with S. Macedo), The Diversity of Rights in Contemporary Ethical and Political Thought
  

  The Nature of Rights at the American Founding and Beyond ed. B. Shain (University of Virginia Press, 2007): 280-302.

• Luciano Floridi, The logic of being informed
  

  Logique et Analyse, 2006, 49.196, 433-460.

• Marc Moffett (with John Bengson & Jen Wright), The folk on know how
• —-, Reasonable disagreement and rational group inquiry
• —- (with John Bengson), Know-how and concept possession
• Marcus Rossberg (with Daniel Cohnitz), Logical Consequence for Nominalists
  

  in: Abstraction and Reduction, ed. X. de Donato, special issue of Theoria, forthcoming

• Paul Lodge (with Stephen Puryear ), Unconscious Conceiving and Leibniz’s Argument for Primitive Concepts
  

  In a recent paper, Dennis Plaisted examines an important argument that Leibniz gives for the existence of primitive concepts. Plaisted concentrates on a version of the argument found in a piece from the late 1670s called Of an Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking. However, truncated versions of essentially the same argument can be found in several other writings from the period. Plaisted begins his treatment by sketching a natural reading of Leibniz’s argument. He points out that, on this reading, the argument implies something clearly inconsistent with Leibniz’s other views. To save Leibniz from contradiction, Plaisted offers a revision. However, his account faces a number of serious difficulties and therefore does not successfully eliminate the inconsistency. We explain these difficulties and propose a more plausible alternative. Whilst our paper is constructed around a critique of Plaisted’s article, it has a broader scope. For in responding to the interesting problem that he identifies, we discuss in detail the neglected topic of Leibniz’s views on the nature of conceiving and, in the process, we bring to light his commitment to the somewhat surprising thesis that one can conceive something through a concept even if one has no conscious grasp of that concept.

• Paul Roth, The Epistemology of Science after Quine
  

  in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science, Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd, eds, New York: Routledge.

• Pete Mandik (with Josh Weisberg), Type-Q Materialism
  

  In Chase Wrenn, ed. Festschrift for Roger F. Gibson, Jr. , under contract for Peter Lang Publishing Group. (linked file contains uncorrected page proofs). As Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine’s brief flirtation with a “mitigated phenomenalism” (Gibson’s phrase) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Quine’s ontology of 1953 (”On Mental Entities”) and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might wonder why Quinean lessons were insufficiently transmitted to the current generation. Chalmers (1996a, 2003a) has been a prominent member of the neo-dualists, though he does not leave Quine unmentioned. Neo-dualist arguments proceed by inferring from an epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal to an ontological gap between the physical and the phenomenal. Chalmers sorts various materialist responses to these arguments as follows: Type-A materialism denies that there’s any epistemic gap in the first place. Type-B materialism accepts that there is an epistemic gap, but denies that the epistemic gap entails any ontological gap. Type-C materialism is like type-B materialism except it thinks the epistemic gap in question is only temporary. Type-Q materialism (Q for “Quine”), according to Chalmers (2003a), rejects the kinds of distinctions needed to formulate both the neo-dualist arguments and the type-A , type-B, and type-C materialist responses to them. Such rejected distinctions include the conceptual vs. the empirical, the a priori vs. the a posteriori, and the contingent vs. the necessary. Chalmers (2003a, 123) charges Type-Q materialism with being incapable of avoiding the problems alleged to arise for the types from earlier in the alphabet. The aim of the current paper is to argue the contrary point that Quineans are inoculated against these so-called problems. We spell out how Quinean allegiance to holism and pragmatic criteria for ontic commitment protect Type-Q materialism from the complaints of the qualia-freaks.

• Peter King, Damaged Goods: Human Nature and Original Sin
  

  in Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), 247-267.

• —-, Abelard’s Answers to Porphyry
  

  in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale.

• —-, Le rôle des concepts selon Ockham
  

  Philosophiques 32 (2005), 435-447. [An English version is available here.]

• David Owens, Freedom and Practical Judgement of (from Philosophy Papers Online)
• Quassim Cassam, Foreword to P.F. Strawson’s Scepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties
  

  (Routledge 2008)

• —-, Précis of The Possibility of Knowledge
  

  (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming)

• —-, Reply to Béatrice Longuenesse
  

  (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming)

• —-, Reply to Barry Stroud
  

  (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming)

• Richard Zach, The development of mathematical logic from Russell to Tarski: 1900-1935
  

  In: Leila Haaparanta, ed., The History of Modern Logic. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, to appear. 178 pp. (with Paolo Mancosu and Calixto Badesa)

• Ron Sun (with S. Lane, R. Mathews, B. Sallas, R. Prattini), Facilitative interactions of model- and experience-based processes: Implications for type and flexibility of representation
  

  Memory and Cognition, Vol.36, No.1, pp.157-169. 2008.

• —- (with R. Mathews, and S. Lane), Implicit and explicit processes in the development of cognitive skills: A theoretical interpretation with some practical implications for science education
  

  In: E. Vargios (ed.), Educational Psychology Research Focus, pp.1-26. Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge, NY. 2007.

• Stephen Stich (with Daniel Kelly, Kevin Haley, Serena Eng & Daniel Fessler), Harm, Affect and the Moral/Conventional Distinction
  

  Mind & Language, Vol. 22 No. 2 April 2007, pp. 117–131.

• Susanna Schellenberg, The Situation-Dependency of Perception
  

  The Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming 2008) I argue that perception is necessarily situation-dependent. The way an object is must not just be distinguished from the way it appears and the way it is represented, but also from the way it is presented given the situational features. First, I argue that the way an object is presented is best understood in terms of external, mind-independent, but situation-dependent properties of objects. Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and ontologically dependent on the intrinsic properties of objects, such as their shape, size, and color, and the situational features, such as the lighting conditions and the perceiver’s location in relation to the perceived object. Second, I argue that perceiving intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representing situation-dependent properties. Recognizing situation-dependent properties yields four advantages. It makes it possible to embrace the motivations that lead to phenomenalism and indirect realism by recognizing that objects are presented a certain way, while holding on to the intuition that subjects directly perceive objects. Second, it acknowledges that perceptions are not just individuated by the objects they are of, but by the ways those objects are presented given the situational features. Third, it allows for a way to accommodate the fact that there is a wide range of viewing conditions or situational features that can count as normal. Finally, it makes it possible to distinguish perception and thought about the same object with regard to what is represented.

• Ted Hinchman, The Assurance of Warrant
  

  In “Telling as Inviting to Trust” (PPR, May 2005) I defended a version of what Richard Moran subsequently christened the Assurance View of testimony, according to which the epistemic warrant transmitted through testimony derives from an assurance that the speaker gives her addressee and is therefore unavailable to overhearers. But neither my earlier paper nor Moran’s gives an adequate explanation of how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address, making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is merely psychological or action-theoretic, rather than epistemic. I aim here to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. One attraction of the Assurance View of testimony is that, properly developed, it allows us to reconceptualize the natures of normativity and responsibility more generally, viewing the assurance as implicating us in normative relations of recognition, and therefore of justice, that are not yet moralized with reactive attitudes. Understanding this dimension of bipolar normative relation thus provides us with a principled basis for resisting broader moralizations of normativity and responsibility.

• Teddy Seidenfeld, Remarks on the Theory of Conditional Probability
• Uskali Maki, Philosophy of economics
  

  in Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science, edited by Martin Curd and Stathis Psillos. Routledge.

• —-, Realism and ontology
• —-, Putnam’s realisms: A view from the social sciences
• Vernon Smith, Hayek and Experimental Economics
• Zenon Pylyshyn, Tracking multiple independent targets: evidence for a parallel tracking mechanism
  

  Spatial Vision, 1988, 3(3), 1-19.

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Here’s an update; sorry for the delay.

• Alexander Bird, Kripke
  

  Twelve Modern Philosophers (eds Christopher Belshaw and Gary Kemp) (Blackwell, forthcoming).

• Arvid Bave, A Deflationary Theory of Reference
  

  forthcoming in Synthèse

• —-, A Pragmatic Defense of Millianism
  

  Philosophical Studies 138 (2), pp. 271-289.

• Asa Wikforss (with Sˆren H‰ggqvist), Externalism and a posteriori semantics
• —- (with Kathrin Gl¸er-Pagin), Against Content Normativity
• Barkley Rosser, Complex Dynamics in Ecologic-Economici Systems
• Bence Nanay, The Properties of Singular Causation
• —-, Narrative Pictures
  

  Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

• —-, Symmetry between the Intentionality of Minds and Machines? The Biological Plausibility of Dennett’s Position
  

  Minds and Machines 16 (2006) no. 1. pp. 57-71.

• —-, Is Twofoldness Necessary for Representational Seeing?
  

  British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (2005) no. 3. pp. 263-272.

• Branden Fitelson, The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation
  

  CMU, March 2008.

• Christopher Gauker, Against Accommodation: Heim, van der Sandt, and the Presupposition Projection Problem
  

  (forthcoming in John Hawthorne, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 22, Logic and Language, Blackwell Publishing, 2008): This paper criticizes the dominant approaches to presupposition projection and proposes an alternative. Both the update semantics of Heim and the discourse representation theory of van der Sandt have problems in explicating the presuppositions of disjunctions. Moreover, Heim’s approach is committed to a conception of accommodation that founders on the problem of informative presuppositions, and van der Sandt’s approach is committed to a conception of accommodation that generates over-interpretations of utterances. The present approach borrows Karttunen’s idea that instead of associating presuppositions with sentences, we should define the conditions that contexts must meet in order to satisfy-the-presuppositions of a sentence. However, in place of Karttunen’s conception of contexts in terms of common ground, the present theory substitutes a conception of contexts as objective entities that are independent of the attitudes of the interlocutors. Contexts, so conceived, may be defined as containing sets of relevant possibilities. This allows us to define the conditions under which a context satisfies the presuppositions of a disjunction.

• —-, The Illusion of Semantic Reference
  

  (pdf document. Version of March 21, 2006. Originally written in response to an invitation for a publication project that was subsequently cancelled.) A lot of us have given up on the idea that there will be a naturalistic account of the relation of semantic reference and so have resolved to formulate our theories of semantics and communication without appeal to it. Still, there is a resilient intuition to the effect that I know the extensions of the terms of my language. This paper explicates that intuition without yielding to it. The key idea is to give a “skeptical” account of what it is to “know the meaning” of a word, by which I mean an account of the status that is granted to a person in saying that he or she “knows the meaning” of a word.

• —-, Comments on Dynamic Semantics
  

  (pdf document). This is the text of my comments on the project of dynamic semantics for the session on that topic at the Central Division APA meeting on April 21, 2007. The other speakers were Jeroen Groenendijk, Frank Veltman and Thony Gillies. I question the philosophical basis for dynamic semantics. My doubts have to do with the nature of information states and the norms of semantics. I also question the data that inspire the project. In particular, I question the data concerning presupposition and the data concerning modal operators and conditionals.

• Daniel Dennett, A route to intelligence: oversimplify and self-monitor
• Daniel Star, Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism
  

  (forthcoming in Ratio, 2008)

• —-, Do Confucians Really Care?
  

  (accepted for publication before I began my graduate studies at Oxford; Hypatia, 2002)

• David Hunter, Demonstrative Belief and Dispositions
  

  forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Research. This paper argues against David Armstrong’s view that singular beliefs are not dispositions. It also begins to develop the view that self-conscious belief is a matter of belief revision.

• —-, Review of Sebastian Rödl, A review of Self-Consciousness) David Rosenthal, Autobiographical and Disciplinary Relections
  

  in Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions, ed. Patrick Grim, New York and London: Automatic Press, forthcoming.

• Eduoard Machery (with L. Lederer), Simple Heuristics for Concept Combination
  

  In M. Werning, W. Hinzen, and E. Machery (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality.

• Eric Swanson, Lessons from the Context Sensitivity of Causal Talk
  

  (This is a draft; please do not quote or cite without permission. Comments are appreciated!)

• Franz Dietrich (with C. List), Opinion pooling on general agendas: linearity or just neutrality?
• —-, Welfarism, preferencism, judgmentalism
• Gregory Wheeler (with Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, and Jon Williamson), Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks
  

  under review.

• Holly Smith, David Lyons on Utilitarian Generalization
  

  Philosophical Studies, Vol. 26 (October, 1974), pp. 77-94.

• —-, David Lewis’ Semantics for Deontic Logic
  

  Mind, Vol. LXXXVI (April, 1977) pp. 242-248.

• —-, Doing the Best One Can
  

  in Values and Morals, eds. Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (Reidel, 1978), pp. 186-214.

• —-, Two Concepts of Democracy
  

  in Ethical Issues in Government, ed. Norman Bowie (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), pp. 68-82.

• —-, Intercourse and Moral Responsibility for the Fetus
  

  in Abortion and the Status of the Fetus, Volume XIII of the series, “Philosophy of Medicine,” eds. William B. Bondeson, H. Tristram Englehardt, Stuart Spicker, and Daniel H. Winship (Dordrecht, Holland/Boston, Massachusetts: D. Reidel, 1983), pp. 229-245.

• —-, Fetal-Maternal Conflicts
  

  in In Harm’s Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg, edited by Allen Buchanan and Jules Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 324-343.

• Horacio Arlo-Costa (with Rohit Parikh), Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference
  

  Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, 97-119, 2005.

• —- (with Eric Pacuit), First Order Classical Modal Logic, Studia Logica, 84, 2, 171-210, 2006
• —-, The Logic of Conditionals
  

  entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.

• —-, Epistemological foundations for the representation of discourse context
  

  forthcoming in Studies on Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford.

• Huw Price, Metaphysics after Carnap: the ghost who walks?
  

  To appear in David Chalmers, Ryan Wasserman and David Manley, eds., Metametaphysics (OUP, 2009).

• Ian Thompson, Discrete Degrees Within and Between Nature and Mind
  

  Examining the role of dispositions (potentials and propensities) in both physics and psychology reveals that they are commonly derivative dispositions, so called because they derive from other dispositions. Furthermore, when they act, they produce further propensities. Together, therefore, they appear to form discrete degrees within a structure of multiple generative levels. It is then constructively hypothesized that minds and physical nature are themselves discrete degrees within some more universal structure. This gives rise to an effective dualism of mind and nature, but one according to which they are still constantly related by causal connections. I suggest a few of the unified principles of operation of this more complicated but universal structure.

• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Hobbes, Thomas — Methodology
• —-, Abelard, Peter
• —-, Smith, Adam
• —-, Leibniz, Gottried Wilhelm — b. Causation
• —-, Libertarianism
• Jack Weinstein, Adam Smith
  

  entry for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/smith.htm

• James Mensch, Husserl’s Account of our Consciousness of Time-final.doc
• Jay Odenbaugh, Models in Biology
  

  Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, to appear.

• Jeremy Avigad, The metamathematics of ergodic theory
  

  to appear in the Annals of Pure and Applied Logic

• Jessica Wilson, Resemblance-based Resources for Reductive Singularism
  

  Forthcoming in The Monist (issue on singularist causation); draft of March 26, 2008)

• John Burgess, Cats, Dogs, and So On
  

  Comments on Quine’s 1946 lecture on nominalism. To appear in a new volume on nominalism edited by Dean Zimmerman. To download as a Word document click here.

• John Dilworth, The Propositional Challenge to Aesthetics
  

  British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (April 2008), pp. 115-144. It is generally accepted that Picasso might have used a different canvas as the vehicle for his painting ‘Guernica’, and also that the artwork ‘Guernica’ itself necessarily represents a certain historical episode–rather than, say, a bowl of fruit. I argue that such a conjunctive acceptance entails a broadly propositional view of the nature of representational artworks. In addition, I argue–via a comprehensive examination of possible alternatives–that, perhaps surprisingly, there simply is no other available conjunctive view of the nature of representational artworks in general.

• John Sutton, From individual memory to collective memory: theoretical and empirical perspectives
  

  April 2008, 177-326 (10 papers).

• Josh Parsons, Assessment-contextual indexicals
  

  Paper begins: Traditionally, it has been supposed that each utterance of a natural language sentence expresses just one proposition — the same proposition to each person who hears it — and each proposition has just one truth value. Some recent work in the philosophy of language{For example, , casts doubt on these assumptions. It has been suggested both that assessment (and not just utterance) makes a contribution to context (so that one utterance may express different propositions to different hearers) and that truth may be assessment relative (so that one proposition may have different truth values for different hearers)….

• Kieran Setiya, Sympathy for the Devil
  

  draft of 3/25/08; comments welcome; please do not cite without permission Argues against the guise of the good as a claim about rational agency, as such, conceding that it may hold true as a principle of human nature. Themes discussed along the way – extending the argument of Reasons without Rationalism – include: desires as appearances of the good, the intelligibility of vice, and the kind of essentialist claim that permits exceptions.

• Luca Moretti, When confirmation transmits across entailment
• Lutz Antoine (with Slagter HA, Dunne JD, Davidson RJ), Attention regulation and monitoring in meditation
  

  Trends Cogn Sci. (2008).

• —- (with Dunne J.D., Davidson R.J.), Meditation and the Neuroscience of Consciousness: an Introduction
  

  in Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness edited by Zelazo P., Moscovitch M. and Thompson E. (2007)

• —- (with Brefczynski-Lewis J, Johnstone T, Davidson RJ), Regulation of the Neural Circuitry of Emotion by Compassion Meditation: Effects of Meditative Expertise
  

  PLoS ONE 3(3): e1897. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.

• Manfred Krifka (with Caroline Féry), Information structure. Notional distinctions, ways of expression
  

  to be published in the Proceedings of the 18. International Conference of Linguistics, Seoul, Korea

• Mark Schroeder, Expressivist Truth
  

  In this paper I try to deploy the semantic framework of biforcated attitude semantics - the version of expressivist semantics developed in Being For - in pursuit of how to develop a rigorous deflationism about truth. I show in precise terms how an expressivist account of truth allows us to make good on Simon Blackburn’s promise to ‘earn the right’ to truth, and I suggest that it has an attractive payoff in its treatment of the liar and related paradoxes as well. Because the paper introduces biforcated attitude semantics directly, instead of arguing that it is the only promising way to develop expressivism, as Being For does, I hope that this paper also amounts to a perspicuous glimpse of what expressivist semantics can be like.

• —-, Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices
  

  This paper is a survey of recent ‘hybrid’ approaches to metaethics, according to which moral sentences, in some sense or other, express both beliefs and desires. I try to show what kinds of theoretical issues come up at the different choice points we encounter in developing such a view, to raise some problems and explain where they come from, and to begin to get a sense for what the payoff of such views can be, and what they will need to do in order to earn that payoff.

• Matteo Mameli, Nongenetic selection and nongenetic inheritance
  

  [PDF] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55:1, pp. 35-71, 2004.

• Michael Fara, Masked Abilities and Compatibilism
  

  This paper offers an analysis of agential abilities in terms of dispositions. The analysis is shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to incompatibilism about free action and determinism, the paper concludes by using the dispositional analysis of abilities to argue for compatibilism, and to show why the “master argument” for incompatibilism is unsound.

• —-, Knowability and the Capacity to Know
  

  (PDF of penultimate draft; please don’t quote from or cite this version.) Forthcoming in Synthese. Generalizations of Fitch’s paradox of knowability motivate the thesis that in saying that a truth is knowable, or that it could be known, we do not mean that it is possible that it is known. Instead, I argue, claims about knowability express capacities to know. The paper concludes by explaining the requisite sense of “capacity” at work here, and by showing how the paradox of knowability and its generalizations are solved.

• Michael Gill, Indeterminacy and Variability in Meta-Ethics
  

  Philosophical Studies 2008

• Michael Thompson, Naive Action Theory
  

  (This is a reformatting of the version that I have circulated for a few years; I am revising it for a book)

• Kahane, G., and Shackel, N., Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias? of (from Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics)
  

  Nature, 452,7185.

• Kieran Setiya, Believing at Will of (from Philosophy Papers Online)
• Arvid Båve, Why Is A Truth-Predicate Like A Pronoun? of (from Philosophy Papers Online)
• Carlo Cellucci, Why Proof? What is a Proof? of (from Philosophy Papers Online)
• —-, The Universal Generalization Problem of (from Philosophy Papers Online)
• Richard Joyce, The Skeptick’s Tale: Symposium contribution on Michael Huemer’s Ethical Intuitionism
  

  Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).

• Scott Soames, The Unity of the Proposition
• Sorites, Issue 20. March 2008
  

  • «Locke on `Substance in General’» by Matthew Carey Jordan
  • «Quine, the Natural Standpoint, and Indeterminancy» by M. G. Yoes
  • «Temporal and Counterfactual Possibility» by Muhammad Ali Khalidi
  • «Actualism and the Distinction of Truth over Truth in a World» by Edward R. Moad
  • «The Constitution Argument Against Conceptualism» by André Abath «
  • Free-Will and Determinism: A Debate in Sociology» by Jorge Gibert-Galassi
  • «Free Agency and Self-Esteem» by Robert F. Allen
  • «The Interpretive Mind» by Peter Francis Colbourne
  • «On the Empirical Reality of Pure Mathematics» by Jonathan C. Sampson
  • «Nozick, Parfit, and Platonic Glasses» by Wesley Cooper
  • «Kant and the Expression of Imperatives» by Ronald Cordero
  • «Knowing that p rather than q» by Bjørn Jespersen
  • «The Two Envelope Paradox and Using Variables Within the Expectation Formula» by Eric Schwitzgebel & Josh Dever
  • «Hypothesis Testing Analysis» by Mikael Eriksson

• Thomas Johanson, Imprinted on the Mind: Passive and Active in Aristotle’s Theory of Perception
  

  B.Saunders and J. van Brakel (eds.), Theories, Technologies, Instrumentalities of Colour, University Press of America 2002, 169-188.

• Toby Handfield, The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causes
  

  In Dispositions and Causes, ed. T. Handfield. Oxford: OUP, forthcoming in 2009. This article gives a general overview of recent metaphysical work on dispositional properties and causal relations. It serves as an introduction to the forthcoming volume, Dispositions and Causes, which includes contributions from Stephen Barker, Alexander Bird, Nancy Cartwright, Richard Corry, Antony Eagle, Marc Lange, Jennifer McKitrick, Tim O’Connor, and Ann Whittle.

• Tomis Kapitan, Self-Determination and International Order
• W. Russ Payne, What a Law of Nature is
• Wayne Martin, The Judgment of Adam
• William Lycan, Phenomenal Intentionalities
  

  forthcoming in American Philosophical Quarterly.

• Greg Restall, Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity 2008
  

  an addendum to “Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity,” to appear in Truth and Truth-making, edited by E. J. Lowe and A. Rami, Acumen, 2008

• —- (with Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance), Appendix to Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’: the pragmatic topography of the space of reasons
• —-, Proof Theory and Meaning: on second order logic
• —-, Models for Liars in Bradwardine’s Theory of Truth
• —-, Models for Substructural Arithmetics
• —-, Proof Theory and Meaning: the context of deducibility
• —-, Modal Models for Bradwardine’s Theory of Truth
• —- (with Graham Priest), Envelopes and Indifference

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Here’s an update for today.

• Adrian Brasoveanu, Uniqueness Effects in Correlatives
  

  paper, abstract, revised handout, original handoutto appear in the Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 12 (Oslo, 2007). The paper argues that the variability of the uniqueness effects exhibited by Hindi and Romanian correlatives is due to their mixed referential and quantificational nature. The account involves an articulated notion of quantification, independently motivated by donkey anaphora and quantificational subordination and consisting of both (discourse) referential components and non-referential components (dynamic operators over plural info states). The variable uniqueness effects emerge out of the interaction between: (i) the semantics of wh-indefinites, singular anaphors and habitual morphology and (ii) the pragmatics of quantification, which allows for the selection of different levels of ‘zoom-in’ on the quantified-over objects.

• Aldo Antonelli, Logicism, Quantifiers and Abstraction
  

  unpublished ms., 31 pp., March 2008.

• Amie Thomasson, Answerable and Unanswerable Questions
  

  in David Chalmers, Ryan Wasserman and David Manley, eds. Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. (Prior version available at Online Philosophy Conference.)

• —-, Conceptual Analysis in Phenomenology and Ordinary Language Philosophy
  

  in Michael Beaney, ed. The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, London: Rountledge, 2007.

• —-, Artifacts and Human Concepts
  

  Creations of the Mind: Essays on Artifacts and their Representation, ed. Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

• —-, Metaphysical Arguments against Ordinary Objects
  

  Philosophical Quarterly 56, No. 224 (July 2006): 340-359.

• —-, Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are we doing here?
  

  Philosophy Compass, Volume 1. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

• Andrea Bonomi (with F. Del Prete), Evaluating future-tensed sentences in changing contexts
• Bruce Aune, Feigl and the Development of Analytic Philosophy at the University of Minnesota
• —-, Punctuation and Syntax
• —-, Plato’s Objections to Mimetic Art
• —-, An Empiricist Theory of Knowledge
• Chris Pincock, From Sunspots to the Southern Oscillation: Confirming Models of Large-Scale Phenomena in Meteorology
  

  Forthcoming, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Abstract: The epistemic problem of assessing the support that some evidence confers on a hypothesis is considered using an extended example from the history of meteorology. In this case, and presumably in others, the problem is to develop techniques of data analysis that will link the sort of evidence that can be collected to hypotheses of interest. This problem is solved by applying mathematical tools to structure the data and connect it to the competing hypotheses. I conclude that mathematical innovations provide crucial epistemic links between evidence and theories precisely because the evidence and theories are mathematically described.

• D.H. Mellor, Words
• Eduoard Machery, Philosophy of Psychology
  

  In F. Allhoff (Ed.), Philosophy of the Special Sciences. SUNY Press.

• —- (with Griffiths, P. E.), Innateness, canalization, and ‘biologicizing the mind’
  

  Philosophical Psychology

• Eric Swanson, Modality in Language
  

  Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass. (This is a draft; please do not quote or cite without permission. Comments are appreciated!)

• —-, Interactions with Context
  

  My dissertation; MIT, 2006.

• Franz Dietrich, The premises of Condorcet’s jury theorem are not simultaneously justified
  

  Episteme - a Journal of Social Epistemology, forthcoming

• Greg Mikkelson, Ecological economics
  

  In: Ruse, M., editor. Philosophy of Biology. Prometheus Books. Amherst, NY. Pp. 385-392.

• Huw Price, Toy models for retrocausality
  

  Forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39(2008).

• James Mensch, THE TEMPORALITY OF MERLEAU-PONTY’S “INTERTWINING.”.doc
• —-, Lévinas’s Transformation of Heidegger’s Account of Temporalization.doc
• Jan Szaif, Doxa and Episteme as Modes of Acquaintance in Republic V
  

  [Final draft] Paper given at the Université Paris-X (Nanterre), February 2005 (published in Les Etudes Platoniciennes, vol. IV, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007)

• Jeremy Avigad (with Steven Kieffer and Harvey Friedman), A language for mathematical knowledge management
  

  submitted.

• Jon Williamson (with Jan-Willem Romeijn, Rolf Haenni, Gregory Wheeler), Logical Relations in a Statistical Problem
  

  under submission. This paper presents the progicnet programme. It proposes a general framework for probabilistic logic that can guide inference based on both logical and probabilistic input. After an introduction to the framework as such, it is illustrated by means of a toy example from psychometrics. It is shown that the framework can accommodate a number of approaches to probabilistic reasoning: Bayesian statistical inference, evidential probability, probabilistic argumentation, and objective Bayesianism. The framework thus provides insight into the relations between these approaches, it illustrates how the results of different approaches can be combined, and it provides a basis for doing efficient inference in each of the approaches.

• —- (with Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler), Possible Semantics for a Common Framework of Probabilistic Logics
  

  In V. N. Huynh (ed.): Interval / Probabilistic Uncertainty and Non-Classical Logics, Advances in Soft Computing Series, Springer 2008, pp. 268-279. This paper proposes a common framework for various probabilistic logics. It consists of a set of uncertain premises with probabilities attached to them. This raises the question of the strength of a conclusion, but without imposing a particular semantics, no general solution is possible. The paper discusses several possible semantics by looking at it from the perspective of probabilistic argumentation.

• Akira Inoue, Discussion Note: Beyond a Strictly Political Liberalism? Critical Response to Abbey of (from Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy)
• Kelly Trogdon, Comments on Robert Schroer’s “Where’s the Beef? How the Content of Phenomenal Concepts Can Be Substantial Even If They Contain Demonstrative Elements”
  

  The Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New Orleans, LA (March 2008).

• Luke Robinson, Right-Making and Other Morally Relevant Factors
  

  One of the more fundamental questions raised by the generalism–particularism debate in ethics is just what a right-making factor (or reason) is. I contrast two possible conceptions of such factors and defend the second. The first understands right-making factors in terms of moral laws, and variants of it are advanced by writers on either side of the generalism–particularism debate. The second understands right-making factors in terms of right-making properties conceived dispositionally—i.e., as powers, capacities, etc. I defend the latter, dispositionalist conception on the basis of its ability to elucidate and explain various features that right-making factors are widely taken to have, including the ability to contribute to the overall moral status of an action without determining it. I also offer dispositionalist conceptions of other morally relevant factors, including defeaters, intensifiers, and disablers. And I deploy these conceptions to elucidate and defend moral holism (or the holism of the right-making relation).

• —-, The Metaphysics of Moral Conflict
  

  One of the more fundamental questions raised by the generalism–particularism debate in ethics is just what a right-making factor (or reason) is. I contrast two possible conceptions of such factors and defend the second. The first understands right-making factors in terms of moral laws, and variants of it are advanced by writers on either side of the generalism–particularism debate. The second understands right-making factors in terms of right-making properties conceived dispositionally—i.e., as powers, capacities, etc. I defend the latter, dispositionalist conception on the basis of its ability to elucidate and explain various features that right-making factors are widely taken to have, including the ability to contribute to the overall moral status of an action without determining it. I also offer dispositionalist conceptions of other morally relevant factors, including defeaters, intensifiers, and disablers. And I deploy these conceptions to elucidate and defend moral holism (or the holism of the right-making relation).

• —-, Moral Holism, the Additive Fallacy, and the “Atomistic” Model
  

  The “atomistic” model can model the intuitions that motivate both moral holism—the view that moral valence is variable—and Shelley Kagan’s claim that the additive fallacy is indeed a fallacy. This suggests that we can accept that the additive fallacy is, in fact, a fallacy without rejecting moral atomism; that we can reject both the additive model and the additive assumption without rejecting moral atomism; and that we can resist moral holism by simply allowing that the governing function is non-additive. Against all of this, I argue that the “atomistic” model is best seen as a mathematical model of moral holism; that if it is seen otherwise, its coherence is in doubt; and that even if it can be shown to be a coherent alternative to moral holism, the latter does a considerably better job of capturing the relevant intuitions. Taken together, these arguments show not only that the moral atomist may well be committed to both the additive model and the additive assumption, and hence to denying that the additive fallacy is a fallacy, but also that the “atomistic” model is of no use to moral atomists in resisting moral holism.

• Marcus Rossberg, First-Order Logic, Second-Order Logic, and Completeness
  

  in: V. Hendricks et al. (eds.): First-Order Logic Revisited. Berlin: Logos, 2004, pp. 303-321

• —-, Leonard, Goodman, and the Development of the Calculus of Individuals
  

  in G. Ernst et al. (eds.): Nelson Goodman: From Logic to Art. Frankfurt: Ontos, forthcoming

• Matti Eklund, The Descriptive and the Evaluative
  

  (Written for colloquium talk in Aarhus, Denmark.)

• —-, Characterizing Vagueness
  

  Philosophy Compass 2: 896-909. (Link to Philosophy Compass.)

• Michael Jacovides, Locke and the Visual Array
• Nicolas Bullot, Attention, Information and Epistemic Perception
  

  (in press, under contract with MIT Press, accepted on June 30th, 2006). Attention, Information and Epistemic Perception. In Terzis, G. & Arp, R. (Eds) Information and the Living Systems: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology. The MIT Press. (14,000 words)

• —- (with Hohenberger, A.), How do children infer intentions from tracking individuals?
  

  A developmental account grounded in mental files. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology. [PDF] [Peer reviewed]

• Niko Kolodny, The Myth of Practical Consistency
  

  European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming) (revised 8/17/07).

• Nuel Belnap, How a computer should think
  

  (from Entailment II)

• Peter Carruthers, The illusion of conscious will
  

  Synthese, 159 (2007).

• Marcus Rossberg, First-Order Logic, Second-Order Logic, and Completeness
• —- (with Nikolaj Jang Pedersen), McGee on Open-ended Schemas
• —- (with Philip Ebert), What is the Purpose of Neo-Logicism?
• —-, Leonard, Goodman, and the Development of the Calculus of Individuals
• Ross Cameron, There are no things that are musical works
  

  conditionally accepted by the British Journal of Aesthetics

• Sergi Rosell, On An Attempt to Undermine Reason-Responsive Compatibilism by Appealing to Moral Luck. Reply to Gerald K. Harrison of (from Sorites)
• Nick Trakakis, Whither Morality in a Hard Determinist World? of (from Sorites)
• Daniel Laurier, Essential Dependence and Realism of (from Sorites)
• Rani Lill Anjum, The Logic of `If’ — Or How to Philosophically Eliminate Conditional Relations of (from Sorites)
• David Michael Wolach, Wittgenstein and the Sorites Paradox of (from Sorites)
• Paul Formosa, Saying the Unsayable: Wittgenstein’s Early Ethical Thought of (from Sorites)
• Jack Lee, Is the Yellow Ball Green? of (from Sorites)
• Anthony D. Baldino, Incommensurability and Interpretation of (from Sorites)
• Dan López de Sa, On the Semantic Indecision of Vague Singular Terms of (from Sorites)
• Yuki Miyoshi, Truthmakers for Negative Truths of (from Sorites)
• Elisabetta Lalumera, Reference, Knowledge, and Scepticism about Meaning of (from Sorites)
• Zenon Pylyshyn (with Franconeri, Lin, Fisher & Enns), Evidence against a speed limit in multiple Object Tracking
  

  in press, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,

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Here’s an update for today; sorry it’s later this week than usual. There will definitely not be an update next Monday; a good guess puts the next update at late next week. Otherwise, the following Monday is likely. My life is a little crazy lately…

• Achille Varzi, Boundaries, Conventions, and Realism
  

  draft of a paper to be presented at the 11th Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, “Carving Nature at Its Joints”, Moscow (Idaho), March 15, 2008.

• Anne Newstead, Review of Oppy’s Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity
  

  Australasian J. of Philosophy 85 (2007), 679-82.

• B. Janz, Making a Scene and Dwelling in Place: Exhaustion at the Edges of Modes of Place-Making
  

  INVENT-L Conference, UF, Gainesville, FL, 22-24 February 2007. (in press - see this page for all the papers)

• —-, Places that Disasters Leave Behind
  

  (FACS Literary Journal, 2007)

• Bence Nanay, Symmetry between the Intentionality of Minds and Machines? The Biological Plausibility of Dennett’s Position
  

  Minds and Machines 16 (2006) no. 1. pp. 57-71. [full text]

• —-, Is Twofoldness Necessary for Representational Seeing?
  

  British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (2005) no. 3. pp. 263-272. [full text]

• —-, Taking Twofoldness Seriously. Walton on Imagination and Depiction
  

  Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (2004) no. 3. pp. 285-289. [full text]

• —-, Evolutionary Psychology and the Selectionist Model of Neural Development: A Combined Approach
  

  Evolution and Cognition 8 (2002) pp. 200-206. [abstract] [full text]

• —-, The Return of the Replicator: What is Philosophically Significant in a General Account of Replication and Selection
  

  Biology and Philosophy 17 (2002) no. 1. pp. 109-121. [full text]

• Christian Wüthrich (with Hajnal Andréka and István Németi), A twist in the geometry of rotating black holes: seeking the cause of acausality
• Christoph Hoerl, On Being Stuck in Time
  

  Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

• David Nicolas, Mass nouns and plural logic
  

  A dilemma put forward by Schein (1993) and Rayo (2002) suggests that, in order to characterize the semantics of plurals, we should not use predicate logic, but plural logic, a formal language whose terms may refer to several things at once. We show that a similar dilemma applies to mass nouns. If we use predicate logic and sets when characterizing their semantics, we arrive at a Russellian paradox. And if we use predicate logic and mereoogical ums, the semantics turns out to be too weak. We then develop an account where mass nouns are treated as non-singular terms. This semantics is faithful to the intuition that, if there are eight pieces of silverware on a table, the speaker refers to eight things at once when he says: “The silverware that is on the table comes from Italy.” We show that this account provides a satisfactory semantics for a wide range of sentences.

• Delia Graff Fara, Possibility Relative to a Sortal
  

  This paper is an informal presentation of the ideas presented formally in (”Relative-Sameness Counterpart Theory” .Relative-sameness relations&emdash;such as being the same person as&emdash;are like David Lewis’s “counterpart” relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold over time or across worlds between objects that aren’t cross-time or cross-world identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different contexts. They differ from counterpart relations, however, in that they are weak equivalence relations (transitive, symmetric and weakly reflexive). The likenesses to counterpart relations make them suitable for an analysis of de-re temporal and modal predications. The difference renders the resulting counterpart theory immune to standard criticisms of Lewis’s Counterpart Theory (e.g., in Hazen 1979, and Fara and Williamson 2005). The use of sameness as opposed to similarity relations in the analysis of de-re temporal and modal predication renders the resulting truth conditions as statable in terms that proponents of Kripke’s identity-based analysis can accept.

• Eric Swanson, How Not to Theorize about the Language of Subjective Uncertainty
  

  Forthcoming in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson. (This is a draft; please do not quote or cite without permission. Comments are welcome!)

• Jeff McMahon, Laws of War
  

  in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, eds., The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

• David Alm, Contractualism, Reciprocity, Compensation of (from Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy)
• Larry Horn, Lexical pragmatics and the geometry of opposition: The mystery of *nall and *nand revisited
  

  To appear in Jean-Yves Béziau (ed.) Proc. First World Congress on the Square of Opposition.

• —-, Issues in the Investigation of Implicature
  

  To appear in a volume in honor of Grice edited by Klaus Petrus.

• —-, Toward a Fregean pragmatics: Voraussetzung, Nebengedanke, Andeutung
  

  In I. Kecskes & L. Horn (eds.) Explorations in Pragmatics: Linguistic, Cognitive, and Interculural Aspects. Mouton: 39-69

• Manuel Vargas, Five Questions on Philosophy of Action
• Matteo Mameli, Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution
• Matthew Smith, Reliance
  

  A version of this paper is forthcoming in Nous

• —-, Book Review of Daniel Shapiro, Is the Welfare State Justified?
• Michael Jacovides, How